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Errors  in Diagnosis and Cure 
ADVOCATES  OF  PROTECTION  rest  their  case primarily  on two  basic  premises. 
The first is the commonsense  notion that high-wage  countries, such as 
the United States, cannot  compete with low-wage  countries.  If workers 
are paid twelve dollars  an hour in America  and less than two in Korea 
and both countries have access to world markets  for capital  and tech- 
nology, firms  located  in Korea  can  always  underprice  those in the United 
States. If such countries  engage  in free trade, workers  in the high-wage 
economy face two disastrous options: unemployment  or slave-level 
wages. 
The second is the unlevel playing field argument,  which appeals to 
U.S. national  self-interest.  The real world  is dominated  by nationalistic 
economic policies. The competitive, open environment  assumed by 
international  trade economists simply does not exist. Only the United 
States bases its policies on the rules of  the free market. Foreign 
governments  support  targeted  industries  with subsidies, selective pro- 
curement,  and trade  protection.  The result  is an unlevel playing  field  on 
which  the ball inevitably  bounces toward  the U.S. goal. 
For  protagonists  of both these positions  the correct  response  to these 
problems  seems clear: America should abandon  the view that market 
forces dominate trade flows.1 It should act like other countries and 
manage  trade to its advantage. Imports  of foreign products should be 
We thank  Gregory  I. Hume  for diligent  research  assistance.  This paper  draws  on our 
study, Saving Free Trade: A Pragmatic Approach (Brookings,  1986). 
1. See, for example, John M. Culbertson, "The Folly of Free Trade," Harvard 
Business  Review,  vol. 64 (September-October  1986),  pp. 122-28. 
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strictly  controlled  with  quotas  until  and  unless wage  levels and  industrial 
policies abroad  resemble  those in the United States. Unless the United 
States  protects  its markets,  the argument  continues,  the trade  deficit  will 
balloon  further,  and  the manufacturing  base will continue  to shrink. 
We share  with  the new protectionists  a deep concern  about  America's 
trade  deficit  but  firmly  reject  their  diagnosis  of America's  trade  problems 
and offer three  propositions  in rebuttal.  First, since wage levels tend to 
reflect  productivity  levels, high-wage  countries  such  as the United  States 
can compete  with low-wage  countries  because their  superior  productiv- 
ity compensates for higher wage rates. If developing countries really 
had U.S.  skills, technology, and capital levels, their wages would no 
longer be low. Second, the gains from specializing along the lines of 
comparative  advantage  are  not absent  simply  because  government  trade 
policies worldwide are more interventionist than assumed in some 
versions of trade  theory. Finally, while practices such as subsidies and 
tariffs will affect the composition of trade over the medium  run, they 
will not affect the size of the trade  balance. That  is driven  by a nation's 
spending  and saving  patterns.  A country  with investment  opportunities 
that  exceed its domestic saving  will borrow  from  abroad  and  run  a trade 
deficit even if its costs are relatively low, its home markets  protected, 
and  its exports  subsidized.  Conversely,  a nation  with  high  saving  relative 
to investment  will run trade surpluses  even if its markets  are open and 
its products  poorly regarded.  It is our contention  that the recent deteri- 
oration  in the U.S. trade  position resulted  from the decline in U.S. net 
national  saving  when  the growing  federal  budget  deficit  was not matched 
by a corresponding  increase  in net private  saving. 
Our first objective in this article is to demonstrate  the logic and 
empirical  evidence behind  each of these propositions.  We then consider 
the effectiveness of quota  protection  in saving  jobs, improving  the trade 
deficit, restoring  competitiveness, and preserving  essential industries. 
We conclude by offering suggestions for dealing with both the trade 
deficit  and  the pressures  for protection  it spawns. 
Is the Trade Deficit Due to Imports from Low-Wage Countries? 
Between 1981  and 1986,  the U.S. current  account  balance, including 
both  goods and services, declined  from  a $6 billion  surplus  to a deficit  of Robert Z. Lawrence  and Robert E. Litan  291 
Table 1.  U.S.  Trade by Selected End-Use Categories, 1981-86 
Percent of total unless  otherwise  specified 
Change  in trade  balancea 
(billions  of dollars) 
Actual 
Exports  Imports  minus 
Category  1981  1986  1981  1986  Actual  Proportionalb  proportional 
Capital  goods  69.6  67.8  33.5  32.5  -43.2  -43.6  0.4 
Automotive  products  15.6  19.0  28.7  33.4  -45.8  -38.4  -7.4 
Consumer  goods  14.8  13.2  37.8  34.1  -44.0  -50.8  6.8 
Sources:  Data for 1981 are from U.S. Department  of Commerce,  International  Trade Administration,  United 
States  Trade: Performanice in 1985 and Ouitlook (Government  Printing Office,  1986). Data for  1986 were  provided 
by Lester  Davis of the ITA. Figures  are rounded. 
a. Change  in the manufactured  goods trade  balance  between  1981  and 1986. 
b. The difference  between  what the trade  balance  would have been in each category  if the 1981  proportions  of 
total  imports  and exports  had been maintained,  and the actual  trade  balance  in 1981. 
$141  billion. The decline in the manufactured  goods trade  balance  over 
the period was almost as large-$135  billion. Since both the low-wage 
and unlevel playing  field arguments  apply  particularly  to manufactured 
goods trade, it is instructive to examine U.S.  trade performance  in 
manufactured  goods more  closely. 
The deterioration  in the American merchandise  trade balance was 
pervasive,  across both  goods and  countries.  As table 1 shows, the slump 
was uniformly  and proportionately  spread  across capital  goods (down 
$43.2 billion), automotive  products  (down $45.8 billion),  and consumer 
goods (down $44.0 billion). Similarly,  as shown in table 2, the United 
States  lost trade  position  with  each of its major  trading  partners.  Indeed, 
not only was the increase  in the U.S. deficit  roughly  proportional  to each 
partner's  share of the U.S. import  and export shares in 1981, but the 
U.S. import  shares  of different  trading  partners  have changed  strikingly 
little. The largest shift between 1981  and 1986  was the 3.0 percentage 
point  decline  in the Canadian  share  of U.S. imports.  Imports  from  Japan 
(up from 25.3 percent to 27.4 percent) and Europe (unchanged  at 22.4 
percent)  grew roughly  as fast as the rest of the U.S. market. 
Competition  between U.S. products  and  foreign  products  made  with 
cheap  labor  is most intense in the U.S. domestic market.  If low wages 
abroad  were driving  the American  trade  deficit, therefore,  the share of 
imports  from  developing  countries  should  have risen dramatically.  But 
as table  2 indicates,  the share  of manufactured  imports  from  developing 
countries  in 1986  (25.9  percent)  was about  the same as the share  in 1981 
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Table 2.  U.S.  Manufactured Goods Trade, by Region,  1981-86 
Percent of total unless  otherwise  specified 
Chantge in trade balancea 
(billions of dollars) 
Exports  Imports  Actual 
Propor-  mninus 
Region  1981  1986  1981  1986  Actual  tionalb  proportional 
Canada  20.2  24.0  20.2  17.2  -14.4  - 30.3  15.9 
Japan  6.1  10.0  25.3  27.4  - 38.4  - 38.4  0.0 
Europe  23.2  24.0  22.4  22.4  -32.1  - 33.5  1.4 
Other  developed  countries  8.8  8.3  5.6  5.3  -8.3  -8.3  0.0 
Less developed  countries  40.5  31.6  25.0  25.9  -54.9  -36.9  -18.0 
Asian newly industrialized 
countries  5.9  7.7  13.6  15.5  - 23.3  - 20.5  -2.8 
Centrally  planned  economies  1.2  2.1  1.5  1.8  -1.5  -2.2  0.7 
Total (billions  of dollars)  166.8  169.8  156.4  308.9  - 149.6  -  149.6  0.0 
Source: Same  as table 1. Figures  are rounded. 
a. Change  in the manufactured  goods trade  balance  between  1981  and 1986. 
b. The difference  between  what  the trade  balance  would  have been in each region  if the 1981  proportions  of total 
imports  and exports  had  been maintained,  and the actual  trade  balance  in 1981. 
Indeed, the longer-run  evidence throws even greater doubt on the 
cheap-wage  argument,  which  implies  an  inexorable  increase  in  the shares 
of imports from cheap-labor countries. In fact, U.S.  imports show 
precisely the opposite behavior. In 1960, two-thirds  of manufactured 
ifnports  into the United States came from countries with income and 
wage levels less than  half  those in the United States. By 1986,  the share 
from countries with income levels less than half those in the United 
States had  dropped  dramatically,  to less than  a third.  In 1960,  of course, 
Japan  and many  European  countries  had cheap labor  by this definition; 
today they no longer  do. If cheap labor  really  determined  trade  deficits, 
the United States should have had a much larger  deficit in the 1960s, 
when much  more of the world, by economic weight, had lower relative 
wages than  it does today. 
Finally,  the progressive  lowering  of trade  barriers  between  the United 
States and other  developed countries  was not associated  with a leveling 
down of U.S. wages to those of foreign  developed countries, but rather 
with rapid  economic growth  both here and abroad.  Moreover, instead 
of permanently  maintaining  low wages, Europe and now Japan have 
wages that have converged to U.S. standards  roughly  in parallel  with 
levels of productivity  in all these countries. Robert Z. Lawrence  and Robert E. Litan  293 
Are Unfair Trade Practices to Blame for the Rising Trade 
Deficit? 
There is ample evidence that virtually all countries, including  the 
United States, maintain  at least some restrictions  on imports.2  Never- 
theless, restrictive  trade  practices are not the driving  force behind the 
recent rise in the U.S. trade deficit. Whatever  the slope of the playing 
field,  the trading  system did  not prevent  the United States  from  attaining 
a growing  surplus  in manufactured  goods trade  between 1973  and 1981. 
Non-OPEC  developing  countries  actually  bought $11.6 billion more in 
manufactured  goods from the United States in 1981 than the United 
States bought  from  them.3 
To account  for  the turnaround  of the overall  U.S. trade  deficit,  foreign 
trade  practices  would  uniformly  and  suddenly  have  had  to change  around 
1981. Indeed, something  close to a massive global conspiracy should 
have taken place. Yet protection  is not much greater  in the rest of the 
world  today than  it was in 1981.  In fact, the Europeans  have cut back on 
their industrial  subsidies, and the Japanese market  is somewhat more 
open. As shown in table 2, the United States sent a larger  fraction  of its 
manufactured  exports to Japan  in 1986  (10.0 percent)  than  it did in 1981 
(6.1 percent). In fact, the market in which protection has recently 
increased the most is probably  the United States. According to Bela 
Balassa and Carol Balassa, between 1981 and 1983 the proportion  of 
U.S. imports  covered by nontariff  barriers  rose rapidly  and overtook 
the  proportion  of such  imports  in  the European  Community.4  Since 1981, 
the United States has slapped  tariffs  or quotas  on automobiles,  machine 
tools,  motorcycles, semiconductors, and steel and has flirted with 
protection  for shoes and  wine, among  other  products. 
2. Office  of the United States Trade  Representative,  National Trade  Estimate:  1986 
Report on Foreign  Trade Barriers (Government Printing Office, 1986). 
3. In  fact, according  to estimates  of the World  Bank  the nontariff  barriers  constraining 
U.S. imports  in 1983  were actually  more pervasive than the average  tariffs  imposed in 
industrial  countries. Forty-three  percent of U.S. imports  were impaired  by NTBs; the 
average  in a sample  of sixteen  industrial  countries  was 27.1 percent.  See Julio  J. Nogues, 
Andrzez  Olechowski,  and  L. Alan  Winters,  "The  Extent  of Nontariff  Barriers  to Industrial 
Countries'  Imports,"  The  World Bank  Economic  Review,  vol.  1 (September  1986), 
pp. 181-99. 
4. Bela  Balassa  and  Carol  Balassa,  "Industrial  Protection  in  the  Developed  Countries," 
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Although  Japan  continues to be frequently  singled  out as having  the 
most unfair  trading  practices of all U.S. trading  partners,  it is doubtful 
that such policies have been a major  cause of the dramatic  increase in 
Japan's  trade  surplus  with  the United  States since 1981.  Table  2 indicates 
that the Japanese  share  of the deficit  growth  is virtually  proportional  to 
its 1981  trade share. In 1981,  Japan  accounted  for 25.3 percent of U.S. 
manufactured  imports  and 6.1 percent of manufactured  exports. Main- 
taining  these 1981  shares  in 1986  would have entailed  a rise in the U.S. 
trade  deficit  with Japan  of $38.4 billion, which is precisely the rise that 
occurred.  In short, it appears  that Japan  simply maintained  its share of 
the action rather  than that it dramatically  shifted its behavior as the 
unlevel playing  field  argument  implies. 
The Japanese  trade  balance  over the long run also indicates  that the 
protection  in the Japanese  market  has not created a chronic tendency 
toward  surplus.  Between 1965  and 1973,  Japan's  current  account  balance 
averaged 1.1 percent of gross domestic product  (GDP). Between 1974 
and 1984,  it averaged  0.7 percent. 
The pervasiveness and speed of the decline by commodity  category 
and trading partner also suggests that a third frequently mentioned 
culprit-a  loss in fundamental  competitiveness  due to weak innovation 
and poor product  quality-is  not, in fact, a major  cause of the enlarged 
trade  deficit. 
The Real Culprit: The Exploding Federal Budget Deficit 
If low wages and unfair  practices in other countries  are not the pri- 
mary causes of the extraordinary  runup  in the U.S. trade deficit since 
1981,  then what is to blame?  The pervasive character  of the increase in 
the trade  deficit  suggests  that something  aggregative  or macroeconomic 
is at work.5  In fact, that is precisely what has occurred.  By definition,  a 
nation's  trade  balance  represents  the difference  between its total spend- 
ing and production.  A nation that spends more than it produces must 
necessarily  run a trade deficit. As shown in figure 1, the United States 
has been in such a net spending  situation  since 1981.  Between 1981  and 
1986,  total real U.S. spending  on private  consumption  and investment 
5.  The same point is made in the Economic Report of the President,  1987, pp. 98-101. Robert Z. Lawrence  and Robert E. Litan  295 
Figure 1.  Changes in National Spending and Production, United States, 1980-86 
Billions of 1982 dollars 
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a. Sum  of personal  consumption  expenditures,  gross private  investment,  and  government  purchases  of goods and 
services. 
b. GNP in 1982  dollars. 
and on government-provided  services increased 19.6 percent, 6.4 per- 
centage  points  faster  than  the increase  in U.S. production. 
One need not look far to discover what lies behind the spending- 
production  imbalance. Between 1981  and 1986  the government  sector 
(federal,  state, and  local combined)  increased  its annual  borrowing  about 
$100 billion. Annual borrowing  by the federal government alone ex- 
ploded  at an even faster  pace, increasing  from  $64  billion  in 1981  to over 296  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1987 
$200 billion in 1986. The private sector failed to increase its saving to 
balance  the government's  spending  splurge.  In fact, net private  invest- 
ment ran  ahead  of net private  saving  in 1986,  contributing  to the excess 
level of national  spending. 
In short, a fundamental  imbalance between U.S.  production and 
spending since 1981 has necessarily produced a mushrooming  trade 
deficit. Correspondingly,  only a reversal  of this imbalance  can close the 
gap. How the United States chooses to accomplish that objective is 
perhaps  the most important  economic policy question  facing  the nation 
in the years ahead. 
The Protectionist  Prescription 
Advocates of quota protection for U.S.  industries  claim that such 
policies could improve  the trade  balance, save  jobs, provide  firms  with 
an opportunity  to restore their international  competitiveness, and pre- 
serve essential industrial  capacity. In this section we consider these 
rationales  for protection. 
IMPROVING  THE  TRADE  BALANCE 
Claims  that protecting  industries  can reduce the trade  deficit can be 
best evaluated  by viewing the current  account balance  as a function  of 
national spending behavior. If, in an economy with fully employed 
resources or, alternatively,  a constant  level of unemployment,  a quota 
levied on imports  raises spending  on domestic  goods, imports  elsewhere 
must rise to meet increased  demand, or else resources must be drawn 
from other sectors of the economy, thus reducing exports. Just as 
squeezing  a balloon  will redistribute  but not reduce the total amount  of 
air  in  the  balloon,  so, in  the absence  of a change  in total  national  spending, 
imposing quotas will change only the composition of trade, not the 
overall  current  account  balance.6 
6. While a quota may restrict  the quantity  of particular  imports  sold in the United 
States,  it need  not lower  the dollar  value  of those imports.  Indeed,  by raising  domestic  and 
import  prices a quota could actually  worsen rather  than improve  the trade  balance  ex- 
pressed in current  dollars. According  to estimates  by Clifford  Winston  and others, the 
voluntary  restraint  agreements  on Japanese automobile  exports to the United States 
actually  raised  the value  of Japanese  automobile  sales in the United  States  by $3 billion  in 
1984.  See Clifford  Winston  and  Associates,  Blind Intersection? Policy and the Automobile 
Industry (Brookings,  1987),  p. 65. Robert Z. Lawrence  and Robert E. Litan  297 
To be sure, if total unemployment is  allowed to vary, selective 
protectionist policies could raise production and income in specific 
sectors  in the short  run  without  reducing  them  in other  sectors. Provided 
that some of the increased income is not spent, the current account 
balance  would improve.  The critical  question, however, is whether  the 
economy's total production, typically constrained by the amount of 
monetary  growth  the central  bank  will allow, could increase. Unless the 
bank accommodates a rise in domestic production, employment in 
industries  competing  with imports  will simply  increase  at the expense of 
employment  elsewhere. Expanded  production  of one product  thus again 
entails  decreased  production  of another. 
Movements in the exchange rate provide one mechanism  by which 
this process operates. In the short  run, a quota  may reduce  imports,  but 
if other factors remain unchanged, it will also increase the current 
account balance, strengthen  the currency, and thereby make it more 
difficult  for other sectors in the economy to compete internationally. 
Protecting  such industries  as steel and textiles, for example, will keep 
the dollar  strong  and  consequently  hurt  export  sectors such  as computers 
and  aircraft.  For the medium  and  long term,  in which  the economy tends 
toward a given employment  level, quotas are unlikely to have major 
effects on the trade  balance  unless policies are adopted  to shift national 
spending  patterns. 
The current account balance equals the sum of net private saving 
(saving  minus  investment)  and government  saving (tax revenues minus 
government  spending).7  The only way to improve  the current  account 
7. This conclusion can be demonstrated  from the accounting  equality  between the 
gross  national  product  (GNP)  and  gross  national  income  (GNI).  GNP  is the sum  of private 
consumption  (C), private  investment  (1),  government  spending  (G), and  exports  of goods 
and  services  (X), minus  imports  of goods and services  (M), or 
GNP  =  C + I +  G + X  -  M. 
GNI  equals  the sum  of private  consumption  (C), private  saving  (S), and  government  taxes 
(T),or 
GNI  =  C +  S +  T. 
Since,  both valued  at market  prices, GNP must  equal GNI, the two identities  can be set 
equal  to each  other: 
C +  S +  T =  C + I +  G + X -  M. 
After  C is subtracted  from each side, these terms can be rearranged  into a fundamental 
identity: 
(S -  1) +  (T -  G) = X -  M. 298  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1987 
balance  on a sustainable  basis is to increase the sum of net private  and 
government  saving, either by increasing  tax revenues or gross private 
saving or by reducing  government  expenditures  or private  investment. 
Quotas  may have temporary  effects on each of these variables  but will 
not lead to a permanent  improvement  in the trade balance without 
permanent  shifts in economywide  saving  and  investment  behavior. 
SAVING  JOBS 
Even  if monetary  policy  permitted  total  unemployment  to vary,  claims 
that quotas protecting certain sectors of the economy will increase 
overall  domestic  employment  are  also questionable.  Protection  may  add 
to jobs within an industry,  but it will also raise prices of the goods or 
services produced  in that industry.  Increased  prices may lead to fewer 
jobs for those distributing  protected  goods and for workers  using those 
goods to manufacture  other products. A preliminary  analysis of H.R. 
1562,  a textile quota  bill  passed by the House of Representatives  in 1986, 
by the International  Business and Economic Research  Corporation,  for 
example, estimated  that while the quotas on foreign  textiles would add 
about 71,000  jobs in the textile and apparel  industries,  almost as many 
jobs would be lost in the retail sector.8  Protection of an industry  that 
produces  intermediate  goods has similar  effects. By increasing  domestic 
prices for steel, for example, quota  protection  undermines  the competi- 
tiveness of the automobile  and machinery  industries-heavy  users of 
steel. 
Quotas may also take the form of provisions requiring  domestic 
materials.  These local content  provisions  also raise costs to consumers. 
As Gene  Grossman  has  pointed  out, the  increase  in  the  output  of domestic 
components  generated  by domestic content requirements  can be more 
than  offset by the decrease  in demand  for final  goods.9  Similarly,  quotas 
can induce foreign suppliers  to upgrade  the quality of their products. 
The voluntary  restraint  agreements  limiting  imports  of Japanese auto- 
mobiles into the United States during  the past five years were instru- 
8. Laura Megna Baughman  and Thomas Emrich, "Analysis of the Impact of the 
Textile and Apparel  Trade  Enforcement  Act of 1985"  (Washington,  D.C.: International 
Business  and  Economic  Research  Corp.,  June 1985). 
9. Gene M. Grossman,  "The Theory of Domestic Content  Protection  and Content 
Preference,"  Quarterly  Journal  of Economics,  vol. 96 (November  1981),  pp. 583-603. Robert Z. Lawrence  and Robert E. Litan  299 
mental  in inducing  Japanese  auto manufacturers  to export  more  of their 
large  and more  expensive models.  '0 In principle,  greater  proportions  of 
high-quality  imports under protectionist measures could displace a 
greater  value  of domestic  production  than  would  be displaced  under  free 
trade. II 
Of course, proponents  of protection  have a narrower  objective, that 
of assisting workers in particular  industries. Quotas are, however, an 
expensive means of  saving jobs because they raise prices paid by 
consumers on both the imported goods subject to  quotas and the 
domestically  produced  goods with which  they compete. Gary  Hufbauer 
and Howard Rosen find that the cost to consumers per job saved by 
protection  are "usually  in the range  of $20,000  to $100,000  per year and 
often exceed $150,000."  12 Murray  Weidenbaum  and Michael Munger 
also find  that  the annual  costs for each  job saved  by protection  have been 
high: $74,155  because of quotas on television receivers, $77,714  from 
tariffs  and  quotas  on footwear,  $85,272  from  tariffs  and  quotas  on carbon 
steel, and $110,000  on account  of the "trigger  price" system on steel.'3 
As high  as they are, these estimates  are likely to understate  the costs 
of using protection to preserve jobs.  Proponents of protection are 
generally  more  interested  in saving  the particularjobs  of those currently 
employed  in an industry  than  in preserving  industrywide  employment  in 
the aggregate. But specific jobs can rarely be saved. Protectionists 
believe that  by diverting  demand  to domestic  firms,  quotas  will improve 
the firms' profitability  and prevent layoffs. But quotas may actually 
10. Robert  C. Feenstra,  "End  Voluntary  Trade  Quotas,"  New York  Times,  December 
26, 1984. 
11. See, for  example,  Robert  E. Baldwin,  "The  Changing  Nature  of U.S. Trade  Policy 
since  World  War  II," in Robert  E. Baldwin  and  Anne  0. Krueger,  eds., The  Structure  and 
Evolution  of Recent  U.S.  Trade Policy  (University  of Chicago  Press,  1984), pp.  9-12; 
Rodney  E. Falvey, "The Composition  of Trade  within  Import-Restricted  Product  Cate- 
gories,"  Journal  of Political  Economy,  vol. 87 (October  1979),  pp. 1105-14;  and  Gary  J. 
Santoni  and  T. Norman  Van Cott, "Import  Quotas:  The Quality  Adjustment  Problem," 
Southern Economic Journal, vol. 46 (April 1980), pp. 1205-27. 
12.  Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Howard F. Rosen,  Trade Policy for Troubled Industries 
(Washington,  D.C.: Institute for International  Economics, 1986), p. 5. For a set of 
comprehensive  estimates,  see Gary  Clyde  Hufbauer,  Diane  T.Berliner,  and  Kimberly  Ann 
Elliot, Trade  Protection in the United States:31  Case Studies (Washington, D.C.: Institute 
for  International  Economics, 1986). 
13. Murray  Weidenbaum  and Michael  Munger,  "Protection  at Any Price?"  Regula- 
tion,  vol. 7 (July-August  1983),  p. 15. 300  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1987 
increase job loss and dislocation by raising investment, encouraging 
domestic firms  to relocate, attracting  foreign firms, and strengthening 
domestic  monopolies  in product  and  labor  markets. 
If protection  stimulates  investment  and  the substitution  of capital  for 
labor,  more  jobs could  be lost than  are saved.  14 And even in cases where 
protection  has allegedly  been effective in raising  employment,  industry 
relocation  has increased  worker  dislocation.  Of sixteen  American  indus- 
tries studied  by Robert  Lawrence  and  Paula  DeMasi that  have received 
protection  under  the escape clause-which  provides  temporary  protec- 
tion from imports when the industry can prove it is being injured  by 
imports-only  one, the bicycle industry, expanded after it was pro- 
tected.  15 And even in that  instance,  protection  failed  to save many  of the 
jobs that  existed  when  it  was granted  in 1955.  Although  overall  production 
and employment  in the bicycle industry  grew after 1955, each of the 
three  largest  bicycle manufacturers  closed plants  and  moved in the next 
five years.'6 To the degree that protection encouraged  these firms to 
undertake  long-term  expansion, it also encouraged  them to reexamine 
their  choice of location. 
Saving the jobs of textile and apparel  workers in New England  was 
one reason  given  for  the U. S. entrance  into  the first  of several  multilateral 
restraint  agreements  in 1962.  Overall  employment  in  the  American  textile 
industry did increase by about 9 percent between 1961 and 1973, a 
development  that  some have argued  demonstrates  the success of protec- 
tion. But the aggregate  data  mask massive relocations  to the South and 
West by firms  seeking  lower labor  costs. Between 1960  and 1970  textile 
employment  declined 34 percent in New England,  while increasing 19 
percent in the South.'7  In 1959,  the North Atlantic  region  in the United 
States was home to 30 percent of textile and 60 percent of apparel 
employment;  by 1976, these shares had fallen to 20 and 34 percent, 
14. For  a demonstration  in the case of textiles, see Peter  Isard,"Employment  Impacts 
of Textile Imports and Investment:  A Vintage-Capital  Model," American  Economic 
Review,  vol. 63 (June  1973),  pp. 402-16. 
15. Robert  Z. Lawrence  and Paula  R. DeMasi, "Do Industries  with a Self-Identified 
Loss of Comparative  Advantage  Ever Adjust?"  in Gary C. Hufbauer  and Howard  F. 
Rosen,  eds.,  Domestic  Adjustment and International  Trade (Washington, D.C.: Institute 
for International  Economics,  forthcoming). 
16.  See  U.S.  International Trade Commission,  The Effectiveness  of Escape  Clause 
Relief in Promoting Adjustment to Import Competition: Investigation  No. 332-115 under 
Section 332 of the Tariff  Act of 1930, USITC Publication 1229 (March 1982), pp. 43-57. 
17. U.S. Department  of Commerce,  Bureau  of Economic  Analysis,  Regional  Employ- 
ment  by  Industry,  1940-1970  (Government  Printing  Office, 1975),  pp. 2, 229, 408. Robert Z. Lawrence  and Robert E. Litan  301 
respectively.18  Despite relocation, the problems  plaguing  the industry 
remained.  The United States began the 1960s  responding  to pleas from 
Northeastern  textile and apparel  workers for protection;  it ended the 
decade answering  the same pleas from  textile workers  in the South and 
West. Had  the new entrants  in the South  not been enticed  into the textile 
industry, greater import penetration  could have been accommodated 
with  no additional  dislocation.  Indeed,  according  to the Organization  for 
Economic Cooperation  and Development (OECD), fully one-third  of 
the U.S. clothing  and textile establishments  existing at the end of 1982 
were created after 1976.19 
Protection  could increase  competitive  pressures  and dislocation  for 
domestically  owned firms  and  their  workers  and cause a wasteful  use of 
resources. For example, after an orderly  marketing  agreement  limited 
television imports  in 1977,  Japanese  television manufacturers  invested 
in production  facilities  in the United States, thus increasing  competitive 
pressure on the few remaining  domestically owned manufacturers  of 
television receivers. A  similar pressure on U.S.-owned automobile 
production capacity and employment is apparent as a result of the 
numerous  Japanese  automobile  manufacturers  that  have moved  produc- 
tion to the United States. 
By strengthening  a domestic monopoly  or the market  power held by 
a few dominant  producers  and encouraging  them to raise prices, quotas 
can actually  cut domestic  sales and  employment.  According  to estimates 
by Clifford  Winston  and others, by inducing  U.S. automobile  manufac- 
turers  to raise their  prices, the voluntary  export restraints  on Japanese 
automobiles  actually  reduced U.S. automobile  employment  in 1983  by 
31,000.20  Indeed, the crisis cartels used in Germany  in the 1930s and, 
more recently, in Japan to aid depressed industries create a similar 
problem.  Such  arrangements  may  raise  domestic  prices  and  boost profits 
but  actually  increase  dislocation  for workers  and suppliers.2'  In the face 
18. Anne 0.  Krueger, "Protectionist  Pressures, Imports and Employment  in the 
United States,"  Scandinavian Journal of Economics,  vol. 82, no. 2 (1980), pp. 133-46. 
19.  OECD, The Costs and Benefits of Protection  (OECD,  1985). 
20. Winston  and  Associates, Blind  Intersection?  See also Robert  C. Feenstra,  "Vol- 
untary  Export Restraint  in U.S.  Autos, 1980-81: Quality, Employment,  and Welfare 
Effects,"  in Baldwin  and Krueger,  eds.,  The Structure and Evolution  of Recent  U.S. 
Trade  Policy, pp. 35-65. 
21. See Robert  Z. Lawrence, "A Depressed View of Policies for Depressed Indus- 
tries,"  paper  prepared  for conference  on U.S.-Canadian  Trade  and  Investment  Relations 
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of union  power in the labor  market,  wage levels in any industry  depend 
on the strength  of competition  in the market  for the final  products  of that 
industry.  A quota that reduces competitive  pressures  from abroad  will 
thus reduce the elasticity of demand  for both final  products  and labor, 
encouraging  higher  union  wages and  reducing  industrial  employment.22 
One might conclude from this discussion that a superior  method of 
limiting dislocation from existing jobs  is  to  subsidize employment 
directly, as several  European  countries  have done. Yet in practice  such 
subsidy  programs  may neither  save  jobs nor limit dislocation.  Employ- 
ment subsidies may inhibit  dislocation when temporary  shocks would 
otherwise  cause firms  to lay off workers,  but if the shock turns  out to be 
permanent,  workers  eventually  lose theirjobs  anyway  when  government 
coffers run dry. Historically, such budgetary shortfalls have forced 
governments  to remove subsidies suddenly. In the long run, therefore, 
jobs are not only not saved, but large numbers  of workers  whose jobs 
are  no longer  economically  viable  may suffer  more  dislocation  than  they 
would  have if the market  had  operated  freely. The European  experience 
does not suggest that less adjustment  is required  simply because it is 
delayed.23 
RESTORING  COMPETITIVENESS 
The infant  industry  argument  is the classic case in which protection 
is provided to allow a new industry  to grow sufficiently  to become a 
viable international  competitor.  Given the developed  nature  of the U.S. 
economy, the infant  industry  argument  is rarely  invoked, but a related 
argument  calling for industry rejuvenation  is. The frequently stated 
objective  of protection  is to allow  import-damaged  industries  a breathing 
period  in which to restore  their competitiveness. But if an industry  can 
be profitable  once it has reequipped  itself, why can't it enter  the capital 
22. See Colin  Lawrence  and  Robert  Z. Lawrence,  "Manufacturing  Wage  Dispersion: 
An End  Game  Interpretation,"  BPEA,  1:1  985, pp. 47-106. 
23. For  estimates  of the waste in keeping  the Shelton  Works,  a steel firm  in the United 
Kingdom,  open too long, see Victoria  Curzon  Price, "Alternatives  to Delayed  Structural 
Adjustment  in 'Workshop  Europe,' " World  Economy,  vol. 3 (September  1980),  pp. 205- 
16.  Once  the British  government  determined  to restore  the financial  viability  of the firm,  it 
had to eliminate  the excess labor  much more rapidly  than might  have occurred  without 
initial  government  aid. See also Egbert  Gerken,  Martin  Gross, and Ulrich  Lachler,  "The 
Causes and Consequences of Steel Subsidization  in Germany,"  European  Economic 
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market  to obtain  the finances  to tide itself over until  it is profitable?  Why 
are private  participants  in the capital  market  unable  to recognize these 
opportunities?  The answer  implicit  in the industry  rejuvenation  rationale 
for special trade  assistance is that there is a major  failure  in the capital 
market. 
The United States, however, has the best-developed  capital  market 
in  the  world.  It  has  nearly  15,000  commercial  banks,  over 3,000  insurance 
companies  and pension funds, and numerous  highly talented  and well- 
capitalized  investment  banking  houses, let alone the largest  network  of 
stock  and  bond  exchanges  in the world.  With  so many  potential  suppliers 
of capital  and such a highly  sophisticated  system of financial  intermedi- 
aries to channel  their  funds to capital  users, there is no reason why the 
market should systematically  fail to recognize and finance industries 
able to compete in the international  marketplace. And even if such 
systematic  errors  were  occurring,  there  does not seem  to be any  evidence 
suggesting  that government  officials or lawmakers  have superior  fore- 
casting ability and are unable, by releasing their own information,  to 
convince private  participants  of its value. 
A related  argument  is that  quotas  or tariffs  permit  firms  to modernize 
and restructure  by allowing  them to earn higher  profits.  This argument 
too ignores the possibility that companies could borrow from capital 
markets. It also presumes that only the management  and owners of 
existing firms should be responsible  for undertaking  new investment. 
On occasion, however, ridden  by inferior  management  or by debt from 
previous  investment  errors,  existing  firms  may be ill suited  to undertake 
new investments. Selling assets to more creditworthy  owners rather 
than salvaging  the returns  on past investments  may be the appropriate 
method  for facilitating  industrywide  recovery. 
Significantly,  even protection  may fail to promote  an industry  that is 
not viable in an unprotected  market. When an industry producing a 
standardized  product  loses its comparative  advantage,  far  more  than  the 
latest  technology  will be required  to regain  competitiveness.  In fact, the 
passage  of time may accentuate  the cost differential  between domestic 
and  foreign  firms.  Given the rapid  international  diffusion  of technology, 
foreign  competitors  can also modernize.  In such cases the availability  of 
protection  as an option may divert the industry's  attention  away from 
eliminating  unprofitable  operations  and toward  efforts to maintain  pro- 
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Comparative  rather  than absolute advantage  will determine  the ulti- 
mate success  of  an industry in global competition. Proponents of 
protection  for a particular  industry  may find  it difficult  to appreciate  the 
importance of comparative advantage. Indeed, the preamble to the 
textile quota  bill passed by the House of Representatives  last year notes 
that increases in textile imports and import penetration in the U.S. 
market have occurred despite productivity  increases in the past ten 
years  that  have surpassed  increases  in the rest of the economy.24  But the 
textile and apparel  industries  could have suffered  an erosion  in compar- 
ative advantage  despite above-average  productivity. 
To be sure, some industries  have made strategic  errors  that in time 
could be corrected. For example, the two oil shocks in the  1970s 
dramatically  shifted the structure of demand for automobiles in the 
United States toward small cars, a shift that American  manufacturers 
were not able to anticipate.  Yet even in the case of correctable  errors, 
the'  impact  of protection  on modernization  depends on the form of that 
modernization  and whether  protection  is viewed as permanent  or tem- 
porary. Import quotas to improve competitiveness may well prove 
counterproductive.  The voluntary  export restraints  on Japanese auto- 
mobiles increased  the profits  not only of American  auto manufacturers 
but also of their  majorforeign  competitors.25  While  U.S. firms  may  have 
been using  the revenue  from  quotas  to modernize,  their  competitors  may 
have been doing  likewise, perpetuating  if not widening  their  cost advan- 
tage over American  producers.  Similarly,  according  to the OECD, U. S. 
steel restraints  raised  foreign  profits  as much  as those of U. S. producers. 
In addition, long-term protection encourages unions to seek higher 
wages, which if granted  can further  undermine  the competitiveness of 
the domestic industry. Various forms of protection accorded to the 
American  steel industry  during  the 1970s  appear  to have had  this effect.26 
Some  lawmakers  have  recently  suggested  that  recipients  of protection 
should  commit  themselves to adjustment  strategies  agreed  upon  jointly 
by representatives  of management,  labor, and  government.  Proponents 
24. H.R. 1562  noted  that  productivity  in textile  mills  increased  between 1975  and 1985 
at the average  annual  rate of 4.2 percent, as compared  with the 1.9 percent growth  of 
productivity  in all manufacturing  in the same  period. 
25. Elias Dinopoulos  and Mordechai  E. Kreinen, "Effects of the U.S.-Japan Auto 
VER  on European  Prices  and  U.S. Welfare"  (Michigan  State University,  January  1987). 
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argue  that  protection  would  savejobs while  the adjustment  requirements 
would  help  restore  the international  competitiveness  of import-damaged 
industries. However, conditioning aid on acceptance of adjustment 
mechanisms  has  pitfalls  that  are  not well appreciated  in much  of the U. S. 
policy discussion.27 
Setting  conditions  as a quid  pro quo for protection  presumes  that  the 
government-either alone or together  with business and  labor  represen- 
tatives-can  better decide what form adjustment  should take and how 
to accomplish  it than  can affected  firms  and  their  capital  markets.  While 
advocates of this approach  believe it will result in a speedier  transition 
to free trade, we are skeptical. In fact, given the political  reluctance  to 
abandon industries in trouble, it is likely that mandated  adjustment 
would be biased towards  requiring  substantial  reinvestment  in import- 
damaged  industries  in the hope that new capital  and modernized  plants 
would restore competitiveness. While individual firms in depressed 
industries  may survive by modernization,  it is unlikely  that mandating 
investment  by all, as Congress did in the case of the steel industry  in 
1984,  will mean that all will survive. On the contrary,  such policies are 
more likely to perpetuate  excess capacity and induce wasteful invest- 
ment. 
In cases where agreements  call for the retirement  of capacity, the 
conditionality  approach  produces  another  danger-cartelization. If im- 
port  relief  is to be conditional  on specified  actions  by the industry,  firms 
have strong  incentives  to arrive  at tacit, or even explicit, understandings 
to coordinate their behavior. Indeed, it is no coincidence that such 
policies are  frequently  associated  with  the formation  of cartels  in Japan. 
While  it may  be necessary  for  an  industry  to restructure  through  mergers, 
these are better achieved in the open market than through  collusion 
between industry  participants.  As we argue later, when industries  are 
clearly subject  to competitive  pressures  from imports, mergers  should 
be allowed, but the government  should not shift its stance from trust- 
busting  to trust-building.  Moreover, as Japanese  and European  experi- 
ence makes  clear, firms  that  make  painful  capacity  retirement  decisions 
to raise  prices are likely to seek measures  to prevent  new entry by free 
riders  from undermining  their cartel arrangements.  With  effective car- 
27. For a detailed  discussion  of the problems,  see Robert  Z. Lawrence  and  Robert  E. 
Litan,  Saving  Free Trade  (Brookings,  1986);  and  Robert  Lawrence,  "A Depressed  View 
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telization, consumer costs of protection would be much higher than 
those estimates reported  earlier. When cartelization  is not feasible, as 
in the case of textiles, such dangers  are lower. But where industries  are 
competitive,  conditionality  agreements  are impractical  for another  rea- 
son: the difficulties  of monitoring  compliance  in sectors with thousands 
of firms  and  pluralistic  labor-management  relations. 
PRESERVING  ESSENTIAL  INDUSTRIES 
By harming  certain  key domestic  industries,  trade  can  allegedly  impair 
the national  defense. But trade  protection  is a highly inefficient  means 
of preserving  production  capacity of an industry deemed essential to 
national security. It would be far less costly to pay for the necessary 
capacity  and stockpiles  of products  directly  out of the federal  budget. 
Others have justified special government  treatment  by asserting a 
need to protect and support  certain "basic" industries, such as steel, 
considered  to be essential to the performance  of other  industries.28  The 
government,  they argue, must shelter input-producing  industries  from 
import  competition, or even subsidize them, to prevent the American 
industries  relying on them from becoming vulnerable  to price hikes or 
supply  disruptions. 
The first  problem  with this line of argument  is that it applies only, if 
at all, to products  for which  international  competition  is weak-as  it was 
for crude oil in the 1970s  when the OPEC cartel had effective control 
over world oil prices. When competition among foreign producers is 
brisk,  American  purchasers  have no reason  to be concerned  that  domes- 
tic suppliers  may be driven  out of business or forced to shrink  capacity 
because of predatory  practices or more efficient operations  of foreign 
producers. Indeed, American  business will suffer if government  mis- 
guidedly  imposes a tariff  or quota  on imports  of basic products  because 
such measures would only raise prices and thereby reduce or destroy 
any competitive advantage  American  manufacturers  of finished  goods 
might  enjoy in the international  marketplace. 
A second flaw  in the basic industries  rationale  is that  there  is no clear 
way to distinguish  between  what  is basic  and  what  is not. Many  industries 
28. Eleanor  M. Hadley, "The Secret of Japan's  Success," Challenge,  vol. 26 (May- 
June  1983),  pp. 4-10; Ira  C. Magaziner  and  Robert  B. Reich,  Minding  America's  Business: 
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produce  inputs  for other industries:  lumber  for wood products, copper 
for finished  metal products, and cotton for textiles. Why should only 
one or two of these input-producing  industries  receive protection  from 
imports? 
A Pragmatic Policy for Preserving Open Trade 
Over the past two years, there has been a substantial  decline in the 
U.S.  dollar. With time, this fall will improve the trade balance and 
alleviate  many of the current  protectionist  pressures. Nonetheless, the 
dollar's  fall  is not a panacea.  Its decline  will  reduce  the purchasing  power 
of U.S. consumers.  The only way the nation  can offset the real income 
loss that accompanies  the decline in the value of the dollar  is to raise 
productivity  levels. A discussion  of policy measures  to accomplish  that 
objective is beyond the scope of this article, but it is encouraging  that 
both political parties are concentrating  on the issue and considering 
policies to bolster educational  and retraining  efforts as well as research 
and development spending. In addition, the dollar's fall should be 
accompanied  by shifts in both U.S.  spending and trade policies. An 
effective  policy  must  be capable  not  only  of reversing  national  overspend- 
ing without damaging  investment, but also of holding protectionist 
pressures  at bay during  the potentially  difficult  transition  to smaller  trade 
deficits. 
SHIFTING  NATIONAL  SPENDING  PATTERNS 
As the trade  deficit  declines, the imbalance  between  national  spending 
and  production  can theoretically  be narrowed  either  by reducing  private 
investment,  raising  private saving, or reducing  the government  deficit, 
or by some combination  of the three. All are neither  equally desirable 
nor  equally  feasible. 
The least desirable  option is reducing  private  investment. At a time 
when  U.S. firms  are  facing  severe competitive  pressures,  America  must, 
if anything,  increase  rather  than  lower its rate of investment.  Yet in the 
absence  of higher  domestic saving, the decline in the trade  balance  and 
in  the  associated  net inflow  of foreign  capital  could  raise  real  U.S. interest 
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A second course-increasing private saving-is  far more desirable, 
but not readily susceptible to changes in government policy. After 
decades of empirical  studies, it remains  unclear  whether  saving  patterns 
are sensitive to changes in interest rates and, if so, in what direction. 
The increased  private saving advertised  as one of the main benefits of 
the 1981 "supply-side" cut in personal income tax rates has failed to 
materialize. Net  personal savings stood at 7.5 percent of personal 
disposable  income in 1981.  By 1986,  the personal  saving  rate had fallen 
to 3.8 percent-the  lowest level since 1949. 
The third option-substantial reduction of the government  deficit, 
and in particular,  the federal  budget  deficit-is  by far the most feasible, 
if politically difficult.  Although macroeconomists  may disagree about 
the desirability  of completely eliminating  the federal deficit, there is a 
broad consensus in the policymaking  community  that the deficit must 
eventually  be brought  down from its current  $150-$200  billion  range  to 
something  on the order  of $50  billion.  There  is also consensus  that  deficit 
reduction  should  take place gradually  and, if the need arises, be tempo- 
rarily  halted  or even reversed  if the economy slides into recession. 
RESISTING  PROTECTION 
Reversing  overall  trade  patterns  will not only be politically  difficult, 
but also will take time. In the interim,  during  which  the trade  deficit  may 
come down but still hover around  $100  billion, there will be continuing 
political  pressure  to embrace  protectionist  measures.  Indeed,  despite  its 
free trade  convictions, the Reagan  administration  has resorted  increas- 
ingly  to protection,  and  in the worst way possible-by  using quotas  and 
sanctioning  the creation  of cartels. 
A major  reason why even an administration  as philosophically  com- 
mitted  to free trade  as the present  one has found it necessary to cave in 
to pressures  for protection  is that the two safety valves in our current 
trade  regime  for relieving  protectionist  pressures  are imperfect. 
The first, the so-called escape clause, allows domestic industries  to 
receive temporary  protection  from imports  when they can prove to the 
U.S.  International  Trade Commission (ITC) that imports threaten or 
cause them serious economic injury. Although  the escape clause has 
been reasonably  effective in screening  out the most unworthy  domestic 
industries and depriving them of temporary assistance-roughly  40 Robert Z. Lawrence  and Robert E. Litan  309 
percent  of all applicants  since the law was last revised in 1974  have been 
denied relief by the ITC-it  nevertheless has a fatal flaw. An industry 
can win its case before  the ITC  but still  be denied  relief  by the president. 
The effect is to encourage  the industry  to run  to Congress  for permanent 
protection,  as the domestic shoe and copper  industries  have done in the 
past two years. Another  problem  is that the law allows the president  to 
provide  temporary  import  relief in the form of quotas as well as tariffs. 
And while tariffs  distort  trade  flows somewhat,  they are less disruptive 
than  quotas.  They  also, unlike  quotas,  raise  revenue  for  the government. 
The second safety  valve, trade  adjustment  assistance  (TAA)  for  firms, 
workers, and communities  adversely affected by import competition, 
has been rendered  increasingly  ineffective because of severe funding 
cuts over the past five years. Moreover, even in its heyday, TAA did 
little more than delay adjustment,  particularly  by displaced workers, 
who were merely given extended unemployment  compensation pay- 
ments  without  being  positively encouraged  to find  work  elsewhere. 
In our study, Saving Free Trade,  we outline several changes in both 
the escape clause and the TAA program  that would make them more 
useful.29  First,  the escape clause  would  be more  cost effective  if declining 
tariffs  were the sole form  of temporary  import  relief. All existing  quotas 
and other quantitative  restrictions should be converted to their tariff 
equivalents  by auction;  that  is, all rights  to import  products  within  quota 
ceilings  should  be sold to the highest  bidders.  Tariff  rates should  then be 
scheduled to decline over time. The revenue raised by these tariffs 
should be  earmarked for  assisting workers adversely affected by 
imports. 
Second, we recommend that an affirmative  injury finding by the 
International  Trade Commission automatically trigger two different 
types of relief. First, mergers of firms in beleaguered industries not 
protected  by quotas would be assessed under  liberalized  standards,  as 
recently  recommended  by the Reagan  administration.  If an industry  is 
judged  by the ITC  to be seriously  damaged  by imports,  then  there  is little 
worry that mergers  will lead to imperfect  competition. Second, trade 
adjustment  assistance, primarily  in the form  of insurance  against  loss of 
wages, would automatically be extended to displaced workers. By 
29. See Robert  Z. Lawrence  and Robert  E. Litan, Saving Free Trade,  chap. 5, for 
more  details.  For a similar  view, see Gary  Clyde  Hufbauer  and  Howard  F. Rosen, Trade 
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compensating  workers  for some proportion  of any reduction  in wages in 
new jobs,  TAA would encourage workers to find and accept new 
employment, thus hastening adjustment.  The proportion  of the loss 
compensated could vary with the age of the worker and his or her 
seniority in the previous  job. Extended unemployment  compensation 
would be provided  to workers  residing  in regions  where the unemploy- 
ment rate significantly  exceeds the national  average. Relocation  allow- 
ances and assistance for retraining  would also be available. Federal 
loans for retraining  would carry repayment  obligations  tied to future 
earnings; repayments would be collected automatically  through the 
income tax system. 
Our  proposed  program  of trade  adjustment  assistance  could  be readily 
financed  for at least a decade  by converting  existing  quotas  into  declining 
tariffs.  As a result, there  would  be no financial  pressures  to impose new 
tariffs  to fund  the assistance  program,  although  the president  would still 
have authority  to grant  tariff  remedies  to domestic  industries  proving  to 
the ITC  that  they merit  relief. 
Finally, we propose a system of insurance  by which municipalities, 
counties, and states can ease the pain of economic dislocation. Partici- 
pating governmental  entities would pay an insurance  premium,  much 
like the premiums  firms  currently  pay for unemployment  compensation, 
for a policy that would compensate  for losses in the tax base caused by 
plant  closures or significant  layoffs. 
The United States will not be able to reverse its trade balance until 
national  spending  patterns  change. But in the meantime,  we must do a 
far better  job in easing  the difficult  dislocations  that the persistent  trade 
imbalance  has caused. 